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MARSHALL AND THE "CAMPAIGN OF HISTORY"
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15.
By George L. Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1981. Pp. xiv, 687. Price $60.00.

Louis H. POLLAKt
On April 20, 1982, the University of Pennsylvania Law School's
Chapter of the Order of the Coif conferred on George Lee Haskins its
award for distinguished legal scholarship. The award to the very senior
member of the law faculty did double service. It paid tribute to a
corpus of legal writing-more than four decades' worth-which has
established Professor Haskins as one of the nation's leading legal historians. It also celebrated the publication of the most recent and most
noteworthy entry in Haskins' bibliography.
This newest work-Foundationsof Power: John Marshall, 180115,1 written in collaboration with Professor Herbert A. Johnson of the
University of South Carolina-is volume two of the Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court. Volume one-Julius
Goebel Jr.'s magisterial Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 2-canvassed the Court's prerevolutionary origins and. its constitutional underpinnings, and then traced the Court's formative years in New York and
Philadelphia under Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth. The HaskinsJohnson volume begins in February of 1801, when the Court opened
for business in Washington under the new Chief Justice, John Marshall, just one month before Marshall swore in his kinsman, Thomas
Jefferson, as President. Haskins and Johnson cover the first fourteen
years of Marshall's unparallelled tenure in the center chair. Marshall's
last twenty years-from the closing years of Madison's presidency to
the closing years of Jackson's-will be the subject-matter of a volume
by Professor G. Edward White of the University of Virginia.'
t District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. A.B.
1943, Harvard University; LL.B. 1948, Yale University.
I G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15 (2 HIS.
TORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES) (1981) [hereinafter cited as
FOUNDATIONS].
2 J. GOEBEL JR., ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES) (1971).
3 The forthcoming volume will be based on the research of Professor White and Professor
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Of the "great" cases of the Marshall era-the four cases which
comprise the structural foundation of our system of judicially enforced
constitutional law-only Marbury v. Madison4 falls within the Haskins-Johnson purview. Martin v. Hunter'sLessee,' McCulloch v. Maryland,6 and Gibbons v. Ogden7 will be grist for Professor White's mill.
With Haskins and Johnson thus confined to the more storied but, arguably at least, less substantive aspects of Marshall's jurisprudence,
there was ground for concern that they would find themselves so
hemmed in by the myths surrounding Marshall's early judicial years
that they would be unable to add much to previous treatments of "The'
Mandamus Case" and of those contemporaneous happenings-most
notably the impeachment trial of Samuel Chase and the treason trial of
Aaron Burr-which also played important parts in the bitter struggle
between the third Chief Justice and the third President for the constitutional soul of the new republic. The impressive fact, however, is that
Haskins and Johnson have very largely freed themselves from the yoke
of past historiography. They have managed this in two ways.
The obvious way was to explore facets of the Marshall Court neglected in earlier scholarship. This task-committed to Johnson as Part
II of the volume-was to examine the day-to-day "business of the
Court," the ordinary civil cases generated by seemingly routine transactions devoid, at least when entered into, of significant political implication. In articulating the rationale for this undertaking, Johnson observes that
[d]espite the political whirlwind that raised major philosophical and constitutional objections to the exercise of judicial
power, the Supreme Court conducted its ordinary judicial
business with a calm attention to its primary, though not its
only, function-the objective and impartial resolution of disputes brought before its Bench by private litigants.'
With these words as predicate, Johnson performs valuable service
Gerald Gunther of Stanford University.
4 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
6 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
1 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
8 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 374. One of the reasons the Marshall Court had so substantial a private litigation docket was the emergence of the District of Columbia as a new and
litigious federal enclave. In 1801-15, 35% of the Court's appellate cases came from the District of
Columbia Circuit. Id. at 378. The Court's arbitrament of these cases was made more complex by
the overlay of residual Virginia law in Alexandria County and residual Maryland law in Washington County. Id. at 560.
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in exploring "non-constitutional" and "non-political" matters-most
particularly, cases in the fields of admiralty, commercial law, the law of
citizenship, international law and real property law-which seem "for
the most part to have escaped the attention of legal and constitutional
historians. '
The harder way of breaking new ground was to find new things to
say about Marbury and the other heroics cast in bronze early in this
century in Albert Beveridge's four-volume Life of John Marshall1"
and Charles Warren's two-volume The Supreme Court in United
States History." This task Haskins took to himself. Haskins' method
(pursued in Part I of the Haskins-Johnson volume) was to follow the
structure established by his predecessors" but substantially to enrich
the content. Thus, Beveridge's and Warren's narratives of (1) the Jefferson Administration's dismantling of the Federalist court reforms of
1801, (2) Marbury, and (3) the Chase and Burr sagas, become, in
Haskins' hands, not only consummate reconstructions of complex events
but penetrating critical essays. The difference illustrates the process,
recently described by C. Vann Woodward, by which in the last half
century professional historians have reclaimed American history from
gifted amateurs.1 8
I Id. at 374. Not infrequently, of course, the claims of "private litigants" gave rise to cases of
major political and constitutional consequence. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); c. United States
v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
10 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919).
22 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (rev. ed. 1926).
I The respective chapter headings are as follows:
BEVERIDGE:
II. THE ASSAULT ON THE JUDICIARY
III. MARBURY VERSUS MADISON
IV. IMPEACHMENT
VI. THE BURR CONSPIRACY
WARREN:
IV. MARSHALL, JEFFERSON, AND THE JUDICIARY
VI. IMPEACHMENT AND TREASON
VII. JUDGE JOHNSON AND THE EMBARGO
VIII. PENNSYLVANIA AND GEORGIA AGAINST THE COURT
HASKINS:
V. JEFFERSON'S ATTACK ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
VI. MARBURY V. MADISON
VII. IMPEACHMENT
VIII. HABEAS CORPUS, TREASON, AND THE TRIAL OF AARON
BURR
IX. EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE JUDICIARY: THE
EMBARGO
X. STATES' RIGHTS AND THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY
13 See Woodward, A Short History of American History, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1982, § 7
(Book Review) at 3, 14.
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Haskins' capacity to improve on the prior art of Beveridge and
Warren is well illustrated by his treatment of Marbury and of matters
transpiring shortly before and shortly after.
What precipitated litigation in Marbury was, as we all remember,
a dispute of very minor dimension-namely, William Marbury's claim
that President Jefferson, by withholding Marbury's signed and sealed
commission, was wrongfully preventing him from assuming one of the
forty-odd Justiceships of the Peace of the District of Columbia to which
President Adams, with the consent of the Senate, had appointed Marbury and other deserving Federalists just before Adams left office. Marbury's claim generated legal issues of magnitude when Charles Lee,
Marbury's attorney, concluded that the only available remedy was a
suit in the Supreme Court. The decisive issue before that Court-so the
Court ultimately determined-was whether the Court could, consistently with the language of article III of the Constitution defining the
Court's jurisdiction, entertain a mandamus action, bottomed on a seemingly pertinent clause of section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,14 to
compel Secretary of State Madison to furnish Marbury the original or
an official copy of his commission. In resolving the jurisdictional issue,
14 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81. The first sentence of § 13 defined
the Supreme Court's "exclusive jurisdiction" over "controversies of a civil nature, where a state is
a party." The second sentence defined the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction of "suits...
against ambassadors, or other public ministers" and its nonexclusive jurisdiction over suits by such
persons. The third sentence provided for jury trial of all issues of fact in Supreme Court "actions
at law against citizens of the United States." The final sentence of § 13 provided as follows:

The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts
and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially provided for; and
shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding
as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus, in cases
warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons
holding office, under the authority of the United States.
Id. at 81.
The pertinent language of article III is:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those
in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.
In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Marbury was begun in 1801, the Court granting Lee's unopposed (Madison did not appear
by counsel or in person) motion for an order to show cause. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 19293. Madison never responded to the Court's order, the mere issuance of which was regarded by
Jefferson's partisans as an outrageous intrusion upon executive authority. Id. at 183-86. Marbury
was not decided until 1803 because Jefferson's Congress, apprehensive that the Court might undertake to invalidate the statutes passed in the spring of 1802 repealing the Federalists' 1801
judicial reforms, see infra text following note 17, enacted a statute revising the Supreme Court's
terms of court in such a way as to prevent the Court from sitting at all in 1802.
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the Court, in the opinion Marshall delivered on February 24, 1803, not
only announced but exercised a power to invalidate a congressional enactment not in harmony with the Constitution-a power contemplated
by the principal architects of the Constitution but not in haec verba
described in the document. Taken together, the Court's judgment and
Marshall's opinion explaining the judgment fixed the principle of judicial review-the fulcrum of the American constitutional system
-beyond recall.
On March 2, 1803, six days after Marbury was decided, the
Court in Stuart v. Laird 15 dealt with statutes of less antiquity but far
greater consequence than section 13. Once again Charles Lee was of
counsel. This time, Lee called on the Court to invalidate legislation.
Once again he lost. The statutes vainly challenged by Lee in 1803 had
been enacted in 1802.16 The 1802 statutes sought to achieve two important Jeffersonian objectives.
The first objective was to repeal judicial reform legislation passed
by the Federalist Congress in 1801. That legislation 17 had created a
new species of circuit courts-staffed by a new species of (Federalist)
"circuit" judges-in lieu of the circuit courts staffed by Supreme Court
Justices and district judges that had been established by the 1789 Judiciary Act.1 8 The second objective was to replace the short-lived 1801
circuit courts and the short-tenured 1801 circuit judges with circuit
courts reorganized in general conformity with the 1789 model.19 The
questions raised by the 1802 statutes were (1) whether Congress can,
by abolishing the courts on which they sit, terminate the tenure of
judges whose status is protected by the "good behavior" proviso of
article III, and (2) whether judges commissioned to sit as members of
the Supreme Court can be empowered and directed to sit on circuit
courts conducting trials in cases not falling within the categories of
original jurisdiction assigned by article III to the Supreme Court.20
These questions were presented in Stuart v. Laird because it was Lee's
contention-as counsel for defendants against whom a judgment had
been entered by a circuit court that had been established by the 1802
legislation and that consisted of the Chief Justice and a district
judge-that the 1802 circuit courts were improperly constituted. One of
these flawed 1802 circuit courts could not, in Lee's submission, validly
exercise jurisdiction over a case originally filed in an 1801 circuit
15

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).

1* Act
17 Act
2' Act
I' Act
2o See

of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132; Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156.
of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89.
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, sec. 3, 2 Stat. 132.
Stuart v. Laird 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 303-05.
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court-a court which, so Lee went on to argue, Congress was powerless to disestablish, "if thereby they deprive a judge of his office."'"
Although Lee may not have been entirely surprised that the Justices were not easily persuaded that their Chief erred in sitting in a
circuit court, Lee may be forgiven for feeling (if he did) that, given
Marshall's rejection in Marbury of Lee's argument that Congress could
confer on the Supreme Court categories of original jurisdiction additional to those specified in article III, Lee's argument in Stuart v. Laird
that a Justice sitting on a circuit court could not exercise the far
broader "original jurisdiction Congress had conferred on that court received remarkably short shrift. Lee's arguments had developed in the
following way:
On February 12, in his argument on Marbury's behalf in support
of the jurisdiction to entertain mandamus actions apparently conferred
on the Supreme Court by section 13, Lee had contended that mandamus actions are "appellate" within the meaning of article III's division
of the Supreme Court's authority between cases in the "original" and
cases in the "appellate" jurisdiction. But recognizing the possibility that
the Court would not characterize as appellate an action to mandamus a
cabinet official, as distinct from a lower court judge, Lee had pressed
the alternative contention that "Congress is not restrained from conferring original jurisdiction in other cases than those mentioned in the
[C]onstitution."2 2 On February 24, in his opinion in Marbury, Marshall had found no merit in either contention.
Lee's argument in Stuart v. Laird began on February 23, the day
before Marbury was decided, and concluded on February 24, the very
day of the decision.2 3 Mr. Cranch's report does not tell us how Lee
divided his two days of argument, but it seems a fair assumption that
Lee's contention that a Supreme Court Justice could not be empowered
to exercise the spacious original jurisdiction of a circuit court was advanced on the second day, after he had heard Marshall announce in
Marbury that article III sets not only a floor but a ceiling on the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Lee put the matter as follows:
But the laws are also unconstitutional, because they im2,
12

Id. at 303.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 148.

13 This reviewer's reconstruction of the events of February 23-24-announcement of Marbury followed by conclusion of argument in Stuart v. Laird-restson an examination of the Minutes of the Court which lists the Marbury judgment as the first order of judicial business on
February 24. See Minutes of the Supreme Court of the United States, Feb. 23-24, 1803. (For
their helpfulness in making the Minutes available for inspection, this reviewer is much indebted to
Maeva Marcus and James Buchanan, members of the dedicated staff of historians at the Supreme
Court Historical Society who are working on the Court's archives.)
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pose new duties upon the judges of the supreme court, and
thereby infringe their independence; and because they are a
legislative instead of an executive appointment of judges to
certain courts. By the constitution all civil officers of the
United States, including judges, are to be nominated and appointed by the president, by and with the advice and consent
of the senate, and are to be commissioned by the president.
The act of 29th April, 1802, appoints the "present
Chief Justice of the supreme court," a judge of the court
thereby established [the fifth circuit]. He might as well have
been appointed a judge of the circuit court of the district of
Columbia, or the Mississippi territory. Besides, as judge of
the supreme court, he could not exercise the duties or jurisdiction assigned to the court of the fifth circuit, because, by
the constitution of the United States, the supreme court has
only appellatejurisdiction; except in the two cases where a
state or a foreign minister shall be a party. The jurisdiction
of the supreme court, therefore, being appellate only, no
judge of that court, as such, is authorized to hold a court of
original jurisdiction. No act of congress can extend the original jurisdiction of the supreme court beyond the bounds limited by the constitution.2 '
Justice Paterson's cursory rejection of Lee's contentions hardly
seems responsive:
Another reason for reversal is, that the judges of the supreme court have no right to sit as circuit judges, not being
appointed as such, or, in other words, that they ought to
have distinct commissions for that purpose. To this objection,
which is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years,
commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and
obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Of course, the question
is at rest, and ought not now to be disturbed.2 5
Lee probably surmised at the time Stuart v. Laird was decided
what readers of the Court's opinion were later told by Reporter
24
"

Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 304-05 (emphasis in 1812 ed.).
Id. at 308-09.
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Cranch: that delivery of the opinion devolved on Justice Paterson because (1) "The ChiefJustice, having tried the cause in the court below,
declined giving an opinion" and (2) Justice William Cushing-the only
Associate Justice senior to Paterson-was "absent on account of ill
health."2 Lee may even have surmised that Paterson and his brethren
had their minds made up on the validity of the 1802 statutes before
they heard argument in Stuart v. Laird. But what Lee could not have
surmised was the scope and intensity of the intra-Court debate which
had addressed and resolved these momentous constitutional issues-issues which framed the Justices' obligation vel non to ride circuit in 1802-almost before the ink was dry on the 1802 statutes. Beveridge was to offer an oblique hint of this debate-"Marshall proposes
to his colleagues on the bench that they refuse to sit as Circuit
Judges-They reject his proposal" 2 7- but curiously, did not document
it.2" Warren was to say more-enough to make it clear that the course
of noncompliance with the 1802 legislation which the Chief Justice tentatively urged in a letter to his brethren was endorsed by Justice Samuel Chase but disapproved by Justices Cushing, Paterson, Buslirod
Washington and Alfred Moore.
But it remained for Haskins to report the debate in full. Most
particularly, we are indebted to Haskins for publishing verbatim a letter to Marshall containing the powerful, albeit unavailing, argument of
Chase-a major constitutional paper which has hitherto languished in
" Id. at 308. One cannot tell from Cranch's report or from the Journal of the Court whether
Marshall simply absented himself from rendering an opinion or entirely recused himself. See, in
this connection, Lee's contention in Stuart v. Laird that the participation of a Justice in circuit
court proceedings made for special difficulties when the judgment of the circuit court came before
the Supreme Court for review:
A party in this court has a right to have his cause tried by six judges. He has a
right to an unbiased court, whether the whole six sit or not. A judge, having tried
the cause in the court below, and given judgment, must be, in some measure, committed; he feels an anxiety that his judgment should be affirmed. The case of Clark
and Nightengale, [Clark v. Russell, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 415 (1799)] will illustrate this
principle. The suit was first tried before Chief Justice Ellsworth, whose opinion
upon the merits was in favor of the plaintiff. A writ of error was brought, and the
judgment reversed for error in pleading, and the cause remanded to be again tried.
Judge Cushing held the court in the second trial, and his opinion also was in favour
of the plaintiff upon the merits. A second writ of error was brought and tried in the
supreme court before Chief Justice Ellsworth, Judges Cushing, Paterson, Washington, and Chase, and the judgment was reversed by the three last-mentioned judges,
who made a majority of the court.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 305. Cranch's notation in Stuart v. Laird, and clues in certain other cases,
have led Professor Johnson to the important conclusion that Marshall's near monopoly on Court
opinions in his first decade as Chief Justice traces to a convention that the senior participating
Justice would speak for the Court even though the opinion delivered may not have been that
Justice's handiwork. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 382-89.
17 3 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 10, at xii (table of contents summary of ch. II).
" 2 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 10, ch. II.
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obscurity.29 Chase's argument is of interest as an elaborate examination
of the issues so summarily disposed of by Paterson in Stuart v. Laird.
And Chase's argument has a separate aspect which commands enduring attention. It states forcefully, and in terms which anticipate the
Marbury opinion ten months later, the rationale of judicial review:
The Constitution of the United States is certainly a limited Constitution; because (in Art. I. § 9) it expressly prohibits Congress from making certain enumerated Laws; and
also from doing certain specified Acts, in many cases; and it
is very evident that these restrictions on the Legislative
power of Congress would be entirely nugatory, and merely
waste paper, if there exists no power under the Constitution,
to declare Acts made, contrary to these express prohibitions,
null and void. It is equally clear that the limitations of the
power of Congress can only be preserved by the Judicial
power. There can be no other rational, peaceable and secure
barrier against violations of the Constitution by the Legislature, or against encroachments by it, on the Executive or on
the Judiciary branches of our .government. The House of
Representatives, from their wealth and numbers, have now
more influence than the Senate; and it will rapidly increase;
while the power of the Senate must forever remain almost
stationary. These two bodies united, will always controul
[sic] the Executive alone; and even if supported by the Judiciary: The Judicial power is most feeble indeed; and if the
Legislative and Executive unite, to impair or to destroy its
Constitution Rights, they must be irresistible; unless the
great body of the people take the alarm and give their aid. It
is provided by the Constitution that the Constitution of the
United States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and by
the Oath of Office prescribed by the Statute (22 September
1789) all Judges engage to discharge, and perform all their
duties, as Judges, agreeably to the Constitution. Further, all
Judges, by the Constitution (Art. 6 § 6) are required to bind
themselves, by oath, to support the Constitution of the
United States. This engagement, in my judgement, obliges
every Judge (or other taker thereof) not to do any affirmative
act to contravene, or render ineffectual, any of the provisions
in the Constitution. It has been the uniform opinion (until
Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall (Apr. 24, 1802), reprinted in FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 1, at 172 n.182.
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very lately) that the Supreme Court possess the power, and
that they are in Duty bound, to declare acts of Congress or
of any of the States, contrary to the Constitution of the
United States, void; and the Judges of the Supreme Court
have separately given such opinion. If the Supreme Court
possess this power, the Inferior Courts must also have the
same power; and of course ought to be as independent of
Congress as the Supreme Court. . ... o
Clearly, Marshall and Chase's colleagues did not disagree with the
proposition that judges were empowered (indeed obligated) to disre
gard unconstitutional statutes. So it is substantial evidence of the intellectual independence of those other Justices that they not only rejected
Chase's constitutional argument-to which Marshall was sympathetic-on its merits but also turned down Chase's proposal that the
Court assemble in Washington to confer on the matter."1 The episode
helps to make a point that is central to the entire Haskins-Johnson
volume: contrary to the prevailing mythology, the early Marshall Court
was not a one-judge show. 2
iii
The group portrait painted by Haskins and Johnson adds greatly
to prior works because it brings the early Marshall Court alive as a
court-not just Marshall and anonymous associates but a collectivity of
judges-achieving institutional identity against the prevailing Jeffersonian grain. 3 The group portrait would have taken on added dimension
had it also included (in the background, but not simply in silhouette)
depictions of at least a few of the leaders of the professional community
from which the judges came and with" which they interacted-the
emerging American bar. It is not that there is no mention of the lawyers involved in the cases discussed; it is rather that there is insufficient
scrutiny of the mode, extent and impact of their participation in the
nascent judicial enterprise. To be sure, Haskins makes some use of
Charles Lee's Marbury argument in exploring the content and struc'o

Id. at 174 n.182.

See FOUNDATIONS, supra note I, at 171-77.
" Of central significance is Johnson's thesis that Marshall's apparently transcendent position
is largely to be explained by a convention in force during the first decade of Marshall's tenure,
pursuant to which the Court routinely spoke through the senior participating Justice. See supra
note 26.
13 Some historians of the Jefferson period are likely to read Haskins' unflagging criticism of
the President as undue hostility; whether Jefferson was really as far off base as much of the time
as Haskins contends is a question-or, really a congeries of questions-so large as not to be
amenable to systematic examination within the confines of this book review.
31
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ture of Marshall's opinion. But one would also welcome discussion of
the training, professional role and intellectual outlook of this lawyer
who is only a name to us but who was in his own time one of
America's leading lawyers. (Lee in the Federalist years had been Marshall's close political ally and cabinet colleague; in the opening years of
Marshall's Chief Justiceship, Lee not only argued Marbury and Stuart
v. Laird but also was of counsel for Burr (and for Burr's associates,
Samuel Swartwout and Dr. Justus Bollman) and for Chase; later, Lee
represented the Fairfax interests when that endless litigation finally
reached the Court.3 4) Similarly, one would like to know a lot more
about Luther Martin, William Wirt, George Hay, and a number of
others.
The gap here identified is one of which Haskins and Johnson are
well aware. It appears from Haskins' Preface that editorial economies
required the excision of several items, matters, this one among them."
Perhaps Professor White's volume will have some room for lawyers
and lawyering. Martin and Wirt, both of whom figure importantly in
the major cases of the later Marshall years, would be particularly apt
candidates for such treatment. Another apt candidate would be a lawyer who was too young to play any role in the early Marshall yearsDaniel Webster."6
iv
When John Marshall of Virginia succeeded Oliver Ellsworth of
Connecticut as Chief Justice in 1801, his new brethren were five in
number: Associate Justices Cushing of Massachusetts, Paterson of New
Jersey, Chase of Maryland, Washington of Virginia and Moore of
North Carolina. 7 By 1815, only Marshall and Washington remained:
" Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813). Lee was not of
counsel in the reprise, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Marshall, who
was in-all-but name a party in interest in the Fairfaxlitigation, participated in neither decision.
Lee's cabinet service was as the nation's third Attorney General. He was appointed by Washington in 1795 and retained by Adams. When first appointed Lee had been a member of the
(Pennsylvania) bar for a scant seventeen months. 11 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 101
(D. Malone ed. 1933).
If ever lawyer and law suit meshed, it was in Stuart v. Laird, in which Lee challenged
Congress's power to abolish the Federalist circuit judgeships, for Lee was one of Adams' "midnight judges"-but one who (as Haskins notes, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 131, and some
other scholars do not, see, e.g., 11 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, at 101) declined the
appointment.
3 "It is a source of regret that in the ultimate structure of the book it was necessary to omit
special chapters on Marshall, Story, the federal Bar, and legal education." FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 1, at 10.
" For some of Webster's leading cases see Pollak, Thurgood Marshall:Lawyer and Justice,
40 MD. L. REV. 405, 405 & nn.1-9 (1981).
37 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 84.
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Moore had been succeeded by William Johnson of South Carolina in
1805; Paterson by Brockholst Livingston of New York in 1807; Chase
by Gabriel Duvall of Maryland in 1811; and Cushing by Joseph Story
of Massachusetts in 1811. Thomas Todd of Kentucky was appointed to
the newly created western seat in 1808."s
Foundations of Power is a study of the Court between 1801 and
1815, that is to say, the judicial business transacted by the Chief Justice
and the ten Associate Justices with whom he served during those fourteen years. The book is a group portrait, but the magnifying focus is on
the incumbent of the center chair. Marshall was and is the brooding
omnipresence. The received view is that articulated by Holmes, on behalf of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, when, on February 4, 1901, speaking from his own center chair, he granted the motion
of the bar to adjourn in honor of the centenary of Marshall's accession
to the Chief Justiceship:
If I were to think of John Marshall simply by number
and measure in the abstract, I might hesitate in my superlatives, just as I should hesitate over the battle of the Brandywine if I thought of it apart from its place in the line of
historic cause. But such thinking is empty in the same proportion that it is abstract. It is most idle to take a man apart
from the circumstances which, in fact, were his. To be sure,
it is easier in fancy to separate a person from his riches than
from his character. But it is just as futile. Remove a square
inch of mucous membrane, and the tenor will sing no more.
Remove a little cube from the brain, and the orator will be
speechless; or another, and the brave, generous and profound
spirit becomes a timid and querulous trifler. A great man
represents a great ganglion in the nerves of society, or, to
vary the figure, a strategic point in the campaign of history,
and part of his greatness consists in his being there. I no
more can separate John Marshall from the fortunate circumstance that the appointment of Chief Justice fell to John
Adams, instead of to Jefferson a month later, and so gave it
to a Federalist and loose constructionist to start the working
of the Constitution, than I can separate the black line
through which he sent his electric fire at Fort Wagner from
Colonel Shaw. When we celebrate Marshall we celebrate at
the same time and indivisibly the inevitable fact that the oneness of the nation and the supremacy of the national Consti33

Id. at 389-92.

19821],

BOOK REVIEW

tution were declared to govern the dealings of man with man
by the judgments and decrees of the most august of courts.
The Federalist, when I read it many years ago, seemed
to me a truly original and wonderful production for the time.
I do not trust even that judgment unrevised when I remember that The Federalist and its authors struck a distinguished English friend of mine as finite; and I should feel a
greater doubt whether, after Hamilton and the Constitution
itself, Marshall's work proved more than a strong intellect, a
good style, personal ascendancy in his court, courage, justice
and the convictions of his party. My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and great cases,
but by little decisions which the common run of selectors
would pass by because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet which have in them the
germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound
interstitial change in the very tissue of the law. The men
whom I should be tempted to commemorate would be the
originators of transforming thought. They often are half obscure, because what the world pays for is judgment, not the
original mind.
But what I have said does not mean that I shall join in
this celebration or in granting the motion before the court in
any half-hearted way. Not only do I recur to what I said in
the beginning, and remembering that you cannot separate a
man from his place, remember also that there fell to Marshall perhaps the greatest place that ever was filled by a
judge; but when I consider his might, his justice, and his
wisdom, I do fully believe that if American law' were to be
represented by a single figure, sceptic and worshipper alike
would agree without dispute that the figure could be but one
alone, and that one, John Marshall. 9
The received view is not the only possible view. We are cogently
reminded of this by Jennifer Nedelsky's thoughtful essay in which she
reviews Foundations of Power and the late Herbert Storing's The
4 ° As Professor Nedelsky shows, persons not
Complete Anti-Federalist
persuaded of the validity of the Federalist principles of Hamilton and
09
0. W. HOLMES, SPEECHES 88-90 (1934).
40 Nedelsky, Confining DemocraticPolitics: Anti-Federalists,Federalists,and the Constitu-

tion, 96 HARV. L. REV. 340 (1982).
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Madison would not be likely to admire Marshall's vast jurisprudential
edifice. Marshall's greatness is a direct function of the enduring ascendancy of Federalist principles in the "campaign of history." ' Haskins
and Johnson have admirably chronicled early days in that triumphant
.campaign.

' Most readers probably regard Holmes' assessment of Marshall as strongly favorable. It is
notable, however, that the fact that Holmes was more impressed by Marshall's place in the historical continuum than by his individually heroic stature so troubled President Theodore Roosevelt
that the President for a time was uncertain whether he should select Holmes (whom, the Marshall
speech apart, he greatly admired) to succeed Justice Gray on the latter's death in 1902. But,
happily, the President overcame those misgivings. See M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF
JUSTICE HOLMES xxxi-xxxii (1948).
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EMULATING THE MARSHALL COURT: THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE RULE OF LAW TO
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15. By
George L. Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1981. Pp. xiv, 687. Price $60.00.
WILLIAM

E. NELSONI

In Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-15,1 George L.
Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson argue that John Marshall's great accomplishment as Chief Justice was to establish the -rule of law as the
basis of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. They describe how the
Court, which was "[a] relatively feeble institution during the 1790's,
... acquired in only a few years' time, and largely under the guiding
hand of John Marshall, more power than even the framers of the Constitution may have anticipated." It acquired this power by becoming "a
bulwark of an identifiable rule of law as distinct from the accommodations of politics."'
Eighteenth-century courts "were viewed as an arm of the administration" which, like the executive branch, engaged in political as well
as strictly legal activities.$ In England, for example, Lord Mansfield
was a central figure in the King's government during most of his time
on the bench,4 while in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts Thomas
Hutchinson served simultaneously as Lieutenant Governor and Chief
Justice before being promoted to the Governorship.' Similarly, in colonial New York the courts aided the executive in the prosecution of
John Peter Zenger.6 "Harmony among the three branches was not only
t Professor of Law, New York University. A.B., 1962, Hamilton College; L.L.B., 1965,
New York University; Ph.D., 1971, Harvard University. The author is indebted to Steven A.
Reiss for his comments and criticisms and to the Law Center Foundation of New York University
for research support.
I G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15 (2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES) (1981) [hereinafter cited as
FOUNDATIONS].
2 Id. at 7; see also id. at 648-49.
3 Id. at 206.
4 Lord Mansfield held positions as a cabinet member and Speaker of the House of Lords in
addition to his post as Chief Justice of the King's Bench. See C. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 36-46
(1936).
See B. BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON 39-54 (1974).
See L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 126-34 (1960).
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expected, but had existed to a substantial extent during the administrations of George Washington and John Adams."7 The Supreme Court
in its early, pre-Marshall years behaved in accordance with the eighteenth-century pattern. For example, the Justices riding circuit provided
partisan aid to the Adams Administration in proceedings against political enemies under the Alien and Sedition Acts."
Marshall, however, "extricate[d] the Court from partisan politics" and enabled it "to settle down to its judicial business as a recognized independent segment of the government." 1 In Part I of the volume, Professor Haskins presents substantial evidence in support of this
thesis about the Marshall Court and the rule of law through an examination of leading cases and other constitutional events of the early Marshall years. He notes, for example, how in Marbury v. Madison,"
"Marshall was able to make two crucial points, which are explicitly
stated in the decision: (1) 'The province of the court is, solely, to decide
on the rights of individuals . . .' and (2) 'Questions, in their nature
political, . . can never be made in this court.' "12 He shows in detail
how the Justices weathered Jefferson's effort to impeach Justice Samuel Chase in part by becoming more cautious and less political in
their grand jury charges. 8 He reads Marshall's opinion in Ex parte
Bollmann"4 as an effort "to define treason so that the rights of individuals would be secured by the rule of law" and so that charges of treason
could not be brought forward by the government "in an ex post facto
fashion to fit the actions of particular dissenting citizens." 1 5 He suggests
that the response of the federal judiciary to cases arising by virtue of
the Embargo of 1807 can best be explained not by assuming that Federalist judges were hostile to the embargo but by recognizing that the
judges were simply enforcing statutes as Congress had written them.' 6
In Part II of the volume, Professor Johnson pursues the same theme by
examining the everyday "business of the Court."'1 7 There he describes
in detail how the Marshall Court withdrew from politics and greatly
expanded its legal functions through the "impartial resolution of dis7

FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 206.
198; J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDI-

8 See L. LEVY, supra note 6, at

TION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 97-98, 265-68, 271 (1956).

9 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 365.
10 Id. at 245.
'i
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 204 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170).
13 Id. at 245.
"
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
15 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 260.
', Id. at 309-10.
17 Id. at 373.
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putes brought before its Bench by private litigants.""8 He analyzes a
series of comparatively unknown nonconstitutional cases-Schooner
9 United States v. Fisher,
20
Exchange v. McFaddon,"
United States v.
2
1
Brigantine Mars, and United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee 2 2 -to
show that establishment of a line between law and politics was always
"present in the minds of the judges and influential in their decisions."2 3
He concludes:
In a sense the Court under Marshall had accepted a sharply
diminished role in politics, but in so limiting its activities it
had secured a better control of law, the jurisdiction to which
it had undoubted entitlement. Removing itself from partisan
politics, it entrenched itself as the constitutional guardian of
individual rights against the excesses and vagaries of popular
government in a disturbingly new egalitarian age. In beating
a strategic retreat before the armies of Jeffersonian legislators, the judges arrived at a delineation of judicial power
such that even their detractors were forced to concede the
validity of their pretensions, and Republican judges found
incumbent Federalist judges to be of one mind with them.
Upon this consensus was built the foundations of the Supreme Court of the United States as we know it today. 2 '
The extensive evidence presented in Foundations of Power makes
it a persuasive account of the early Marshall years. Historians can
plausibly understand that John Marshall transformed the Supreme
Court from a political into a more purely legal institution and that he
established as the Court's most basic task the application to adjudication of the rule of law. Foundations of Power has significance, however,
not only as a portrait of the past but also as a guide for the present.
Haskins and Johnson portray Marshall as a great judge whom modern
judges should admire and emulate.
Their monumental work of history does not, however, endeavor to
answer three questions that analysts of the modern Court might ask in
determining whether today's Supreme Court should strive to emulate
the Marshall Court. First, at a purely theoretical level, why should the
modern Court act as a nonpolitical body that merely applies and elaboIS Id. at 374.
19 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
20 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1804).
" 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 417 (1814).
2 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814).
2S FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 405.
24 Id. at 406.
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rates the rule of law? Second, if the modern Court were to decide to
emulate the Marshall Court, how could it carve out for itself a legal
function distinct from more political functions which it might and
which other institutions do perform; that is, how might the Court give
meaning to the concept of the rule of law? Third, what obstacles exist
to today's Court assuming a nonpolitical role similar to that of the
Marshall Court? This essay will address these questions in a tentative
fashion and suggest some directions that future thinking and research
might take.
I. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Why should the Supreme Court today emulate the Marshall
Court and act as a nonpolitical body whose function is the application
and elaboration of the rule of law? One argument is that individual
rights can be protected in the United States today only through law
administered nonpolitically by the courts:
A distinct historical connection exists between the determination of
the Marshall Court to act as protector of individual rights and its contemporaneous decision to bind itself by the rule of law. Both steps were
announced in Marbury v. Madison and put into practice over the next
two decades. The Chief Justice wrote in Marbury "The very essence
of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim

. .

.

protection

. .

.

whenever he receives an injury

.

.

.[in the

nature of a] violation of a vested legal right.12 5 Marshall then tied the
protection of individual rights to application of the rule of law:
By the constitution of the United States, the president is
invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his
own conscience ...
. . .[W]here the heads of departments are the political
or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the
will of the president, or rather to act in cases in which the
executive professes a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only
politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned
by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance
of that duty, it seems equally clear, that the individual who
I

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of
his country for a remedy.26
During the next two decades, the Marshall Court continued to
draw the line between matters of law and matters of politics in cases
like Fletcher v. Peck,"7 where individual claims of constitutional rights
were vindicated, and cases like Gibbons v. Ogden,28 where political
bodies were given free rein to make policy determinations.
The relation between judicial protection of individual rights and
judicial adherence to the rule of law may not, however, be merely a
matter of historical accident. Further analysis is needed to determine
whether the Supreme Court can serve as the protector of individual or
minority rights without some conception of the Court as the expounder
of the rule of law. Some scholars think it cannot. Ronald Dworkin, for
one, suggests that rights are the antithesis of political power; they "are
political trumps held by individuals" for use "when, for some reason, a
collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what
they wish, as individuals, to have or to do." 2 Rights, Dworkin continues, are established by "appeal[s] to principle . . . .A claim of right
presupposes a moral argument and can be established in no other
way." 30 Rights are based on principles fundamental to a society which
are unassailable by mere majoritarian will. An individual or a minority
resorts to some concept of rights when an institution of government
amenable and often responding to the political will of the community
poses a threat that cannot be met in -a political manner. In such a situation, the individual or minority appeals to some force independent of
the political forces of the community and makes an argument grounded
in values other than political ones. Protection of rights, according to this
argument, requires access to an institution free from political influence.
In the United States today, the institution to which a nonpolitical appeal lies is the courts, which are alone capable of interposing nonpolitical values-or law-in the path of the nation's political institutions.
Only by adhering to the rule of law can the Court fulfill the institutional role of protector of rights from majoritarian assault.
If a connection between protection of rights and the rule of law
can be established, then the issue whether John Marshall should be
admired for making elaboration of the rule of law the preeminent function of the Supreme Court and the issue whether today's Court should
Id. at 165-66 (emphasis added).
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
" 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2 R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977).
30 Id. at 147.
26
27

494

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:489

emulate the Marshall Court will depend upon a deeper issue: whether
individuals and minorities should be accorded rights providing them
with protection against the will and power of the nation's dominant
political forces. If a contemporary constitutional theorist, consistently
with longstanding American constitutional tradition,"1 distrusts the
power of dominant political groups, he will want to invest individuals
and minorities with rights based on law-rights that will provide protection against the untrammeled will of dominant groups. Most contemporary theorists, 2 and, I believe, most Justices now sitting on the
Court, are committed to the protection of rights and arguably should be
committed as well to some vision of the rule of law. 3 Many who are
committed to the protection of rights doubt, however, whether the concept of the rule of law can be given meaningful content that will enable
the Supreme Court to act in a purely legal as distinguished from a
political manner." It is to this doubt that we must next turn.

II.

PUTTING CONTENT INTO THE RULE OF LAW

Three different sources for rights-and hence three different versions of the rule of law-have commanded the attention of American
constitutional scholars in the past three decades. One group of scholars,
including Raoul Berger and Robert H. Bork, 5 has sought to ground
individual and minority rights in the text of the Constitution and in
81
2

See W. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900 at 156-61 (1982).
See generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A

FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); R. DWORKIN,

supra note 29; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); M.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982).

A few justices and theorists, however, of whom Justice Rehnquist is the most notable,
apparently believe that dominant political forces should possess untrammelled political power and
hence do not want the Supreme Court to interpose law in the form of rights as an obstacle to those
forces attaining their political objectives. These justices and theorists, of course, do not understand
the Court to be totally without power to declare legislative acts of the dominant forces unconstitu-

tional, for they recognize that political power in the United States has been divided among many
different institutions and that the Court must serve as an umpire policing the jurisdiction of each
of those institutions. Such an umpireal role is appropriate for a court in a democratic society in
which no one institution of government possesses ultimate sovereignty: some organ of government
must police the jurisdictional bounds of the other institutions. For the most recent argument along
these lines, see Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in Franceand the United
States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363 (1982). Such an umpireal role does not, however, bind the Court
to the rule of law since the Court could act as umpire on the basis of pragmatic judgments about
how the American political system as a whole will best function. In contrast, a Supreme Court
committed to 'the protection of individual rights must be bound by the rule of law.

" See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 804-05 (1982).
U R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-

TEENTH AMENDMENT ch. 15 (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
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specific Supreme Court precedents. A second group of scholars, ranging
from Alexander M. Bickel to John H. Ely,"6 has striven to ground
rights in the processes and structures of American political institutions.
A third group has focused attention on natural law and natural rights
arguments as the foundation on which to construct the edifice of constitutional rights.3 "
The Marshall Court did not find law in past precedent, for it had
no real precedents with which to address the constitutional issues it
faced. Despite its protestations in Marbury v. Madison,"' the Marshall
Court likewise did not find its constitutional doctrines in the text of the
Constitution itself-a text that speaks with the same imprecision and
ambiguity as most texts.3 9 Nor did the Marshall Court find law in the
established structures and procedures of American government; rather
the Court was engaged in the process of establishing those structures
and procedures and giving meaning to a new system of governance. 40
A. Natural Rights as the HistoricalBasis of the Rule of Law
In Foundationsof Power, Professors Haskins and Johnson argue
that the Marshall Court based its constitutionalism on the third of the
traditions noted above-the natural-law/natural-rights tradition. Haskins writes that "Marshall recognized certain ideas of natural rights as
great or fundamental principles anterior to government and legislation.' 4 1 The preeminent natural right enforced by the Marshall Court
was, of course, the right to property.' 2
For Americans of the early nineteenth century, the Marshall
Court's emphasis on natural rights sufficed to justify the Court's enforcement of constitutional rights, especially the right of property. Natural rights arguments still have force for some American constitutional
theorists. But most twentieth-century Americans do not believe that labelling a right "natural" confers upon it a quality transcending ordinary human discourse and analysis. Many contemporary theorists de"See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS (1962); J. ELY, supra note 32.
37 See M. PERRY, supranote 32; see generally D. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE
LAW: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION (1982); D. -RICHARDS, THE
MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977).
3 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 200-02.
40 Id. at 201-05, 375-77. But see Nedelsky, Confining Democratic Politics: Anti-Federzlists,

Federalists, and the Constitution, 96 HARV. L. REV. 340 (1982) (asserting that the Marshall
Court's vision of the rule of law evolved from the federalist conception of the structure of the new
American government).
41 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 11.
42 Id. at 336-53.
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mand some other justification before an alleged right is elevated to
constitutional stature and thereby rendered enforcible by the Supreme
Court. The mere label of natural rights does not suffice, and a history
of the Marshall Court written in the language of natural rights does
not provide a strong contemporary justification for judicial review. If
the modern Court is to learn from history, that history must be written
in a language that, although not anachronistic, has greater contemporary analytical force than the language of natural rights. Today's theorist, that is, demands to know in a language usable in contemporary
normative argument why the Marshall Court enforced particular rights
as constitutional ones.
B. Consensus as the HistoricalBasis of the Rule of Law
As I have argued elsewhere,"' the Court focused on the rights it
did, especially the right to property, because a consensus existed that
those rights were the important ones meriting enforcement against legislative and executive usurpation. John Marshall, I believe, understood
law to be different from politics in that the political process resolved
questions pursuant to the will of an electoral majority, whereas the legal process resolved issues as it had in the eighteenth century, according
to a widely shared consensus of values. The constitutional practices of
Marshall and his contemporary judges must be understood against the
eighteenth-century background from which they had scarcely emerged,
not from a twentieth-century perspective. This is especially true of the
concept of the rule of law. If we are to understand what the rule of law
meant to Marshall, we must understand how courts functioned in the
eighteenth century.
What was law to an eighteenth-century court? Law was not simply the command of some sovereign legislature. The concept of legislative sovereignty was scarcely, if at all, developed." Nor did eighteenthcentury judges visualize law as a body of doctrine derived from precedent through professional study and analysis."5 Nor did every eighteenth-century legal thinker believe in natural law, although some, of
course, did.
All eighteenth-century American judges, however, faced a common
institutional reality: that juries had power in nearly every case tried in
13 See Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893 (1978).
"' Cf FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 65-67 (describing Jefferson's view that the national
government should be weak).
"' See Nelson, supra note 43, at 904.
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court to determine the law of the case as well as the facts. 46 And that
institutional reality gave meaning to the concept of law. Law was not,
as a practical matter, what God, the legislature or the legal profession
declared it to be; law was what the jury said it was. And what would a
jury, drawn on a random basis from different portions of the community and required to render a unanimous verdict, declare to be law? A
jury would elevate into law those values, generally of a customary sort,
that were widely accepted by different groups within the community.
Law found by a jury would be, in short, a mirror of the consensus of
the community.47
Thus, when Marshall declared in Marbury v. Madison that courts
should decide cases on the basis of legal principle, not political will, I
understand that he was distinguishing values and principles that virtually all Americans relied on as basic to their social order from values
and principles that were subject to partisan controversy. Of course, the
values and principles enforced by the Marshall Court were thought by
many of his contemporaries to possess a special or even a transcendent
quality and were accordingly often termed natural rights. For those of
us, however, who do not appreciate how law can transcend ordinary
human discourse and activity, the special, legal character of Marshall's
constitutional principles must be attributed to the social consensus underlying them. 48
In the positivist legal culture that twentieth-century Americans inhabit, duly authorized bodies, like constitutional conventions and legislatures, can, of course, make law. It is also possible within the positivist
tradition to understand that courts can declare to be law that which is
grounded in a consensus either of past practice or of current social values. But it is difficult to understand how a judicial decision which is not
grounded either in enacted law or in consensus can be understood as
anything but a reflection of the personal political vafues of the judge.
The decisions of the early Marshall Court did riot simply reflect
the political values of the Chief Justice. As Professors Haskins and
Johnson have shown, members of the opposition party, most notably
those appointed to the Court by Presidents Jefferson and Madison, also
accepted Marshall's jurisprudence.4 ' In practice, the rights enforced by
the Marshall Court during the first two. decades of the nineteenth century rested upon a fundamental consensus about the centrality of pri4" See generally id. at 904-17.
47 Id.

4" Id. at 932-47.
49 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 300, 389-95.
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vate property to the nation's economic and social order.5"
C. Consensus as the Philosophical Basis of the Rule of Law
Do Americans today share any consensus, like that of John Marshall's generation, which can be enforced as law? If they do, then it
may make some sense to distinguish law from politics by inquiring
whether a particular value is shared widely by Americans or shared
only by a distinct political group. The existence of a widely shared
consensus would provide the Supreme Court with a basis to reaffirm
the rule of law and thereby protect the rights of individuals.
Of course, if contemporary Americans do not widely share values,
then a Supreme Court dedicated to protecting rights through the rule of
law must develop some alternative conception of the source of rights.
Most contemporary constitutional thinkers, I believe, doubt that constitutional principles can be found in any widely shared consensus. My
suggestion that principles be sought in a consensus is not an original
one: others, indeed, have suggested it,5" and their suggestions have not
been well received. 2
Nonetheless it may be premature to abandon the search for principles in a consensus. Before the search can fairly be labelled fruitless,
more attention should be paid by constitutional theorists to a philosophical argument appearing in European literature which supports the
proposition that an underlying, consensus of some sort exists in American society today. Let me sketch the argument in outline form here.
Two of the century's leading Western philosophers, Ludwig
Wittgenstein and Jurgen Habermas, have written that, even when people claim they have very different aesthetic, ideological and moral vals After 1820, the consensus that had been enforced by the Marshall Court began to break
down, and, as it did, the Court lost much of its effectiveness. See Nelson, supranote 43, at 955-56.
Marshall and his fellow Justices could no longer claim with as much plausibility as they once had
that protection of property was a matter of legal obligation rather than political judgment. Marshall's inability to enforce as law that which no longer commanded a popular consensus surfaced
both in growing divisions among the justices themselves, most notably in the 1827 case of Ogden
v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827)-the first constitutional case in Marshall's career in
which he found himself in dissent-and in the growing difficulties the Court faced in enforcing its
mandates, especially in the Cherokee removal cases. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832). See also Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21
STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969). For other instances of difficulty in enforcing Supreme Court mandates,
see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821); Dennie v. Harris, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 364 (1830). See generally Warren,
Legislative and JudicialAttacks on the Supreme Court of the United States - A History of the
Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 1, 161 (1913).
5' See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 36, at 239; Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the
Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689
(1976).
" See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 32, at 63-69; M. PERRY, supra note 32, at 79-83.
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ues, they are able to live in a society together because of the existence of
a shared consensus. The process of socialization-of living together-promotes development in individuals of certain communal values and shared meanings that allow agreement, at least implicitly, upon
the fundamental rules of a society and give its members a common capacity to communicate with each other. When people take up practical
discourse or engage in practical activities together, they give testimony
to a common heritage without which discourse and joint activities
would be impossible; they give this testimony even when they are unconscious of any shared heritage.
Wittgenstein, in particular, has elaborated a thesis which holds
that a language consists, in essence, of an agreement among its speakers
that certain sounds have particular meaning. While the correlation between sound and meaning is often far from perfect, that correlation is
sufficient so that a person who hears an utterance will understand, at
least in general terms, what the person making the utterance means. 5
Habermas has advanced the thesis by arguing that people become socialized in a community-that they develop and internalize the moral
values of the community-through "structures of linguistic intersubjectivity."" According to Habermas, an ethical system has "no need of
principles" other than the "fundamental norms of rational speech that
we must always presuppose if we discourse at all." 5 5 Through a society's participation in its common speech, "the common establishment of
. . .moral principles" -emergeA.5 Political and social systems, according to Habermas, rest on such "community or shared meaning."5
This philosophical perspective may provide a basis for the Court
to apply a rule of law based on consensus. Consider, for example, the
possibilities inherent in language. Legal and constitutional analysis rest
in part, of course, upon language: constitutional law and much other
law, for example, is often derived from a text. While that text frequently lacks precise meaning, it is not entirely without meaning at its
core-meaning that courts engaged in constitutional adjudication could
and sometimes do exploit. Most American laymen and lawyers, for example, probably understand the concept of "due process" to mean
something about fundamental fairness in legal procedures. At the same
time, I doubt whether the concept has much meaning to laymen or
lawyers in the context of a woman's right to an abortion. A court comSee L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 198-208, 239-242 (G. Anscombe trans. 3d ed. 1958). See also R. FOGELIN, WTGENSTEIN 144-49 (1976).
J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION.CRISIS 43 (T. McCarthy trans. 1975).
" Id. at 110.
"Id. (quoting 0. SCHWEMMER, PHILOSOPHIE DER PRAXIS).
57 Id. at 10.

500

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:489

mitted to the rule of law, which understands, in turn, that adherence to
law requires it to ground decisions in some widespread consensus,
should pay heed to the possibilities inherent in and simultaneously to
the limits of language.
D. Consensus as the Doctrinal Basis of the Rule of Law
Could a Supreme Court committed to a rule of law based on consensus exploit any common heritage and common values which most
Americans, except at the political extremes, may still share? Could it
translate such a consensus into practical results? These questions, of
course, demand intensive analysis far beyond the scope of an essay reviewing a book. But let me illustrate how the Court might translate
consensus into results by focusing on three of the leading cases of recent
decades:5 8 Brown v. Board of Education,"9 Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 0 and Roe v. Wade.61
Analysis of Brown must begin by focusing on the reason why racial segregation was practiced uniformly throughout the South in the
first half of the twentieth century: to stigmatize blacks as inferior to and
unfit to associate with whites. Virtually all Americans-black and
white, North and South-understood why segregation was being practiced. At the time the Court had first declared segregation legitimate in
1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson,6 2 most Americans were not troubled by a
practice that labelled blacks as inferior since the neo-Darwinian ideology prevalent at the time placed all groups in hierarchic order, from
Anglo-Saxons at the top to blacks at the bottom. Social changes occurring between 1900 and 1950, however, made Plessy indefensible by
mid-century. By the time of Brown, a black middle class had come into
existence-a middle class that visibly demanded equal treatment and
that provided logistic support for a litigation campaign designed to
make equality real. At the same time, Catholic and Jewish ethnic
groups, which as recent immigrants in 1900 had fallen well below Anglo-Saxons in the Darwinian hierarchy, had attained a level of social
and economic equality; they found it difficult to insist upon equality
before the law for themselves without supporting like demands of
others. The new independence of third world nations also undercut the
plausibility of Plessy by raising American blacks' consciousness that
Needless to say, the consensus we look for must be abstracted from and broader than the
disputed issues in a particular case. For example, if a case involves the prosecution of communists
for publishing their ideas, the consensus we must look for is not that such ideas are worth publishing; rather, it is that, in general, our society is best served by allowing freedom of speech.
59

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).

61 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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white racism could be overcome and by creating new potential international allies for the United States.
These real changes in racial and ethnic relations were complemented by parallel changes in ideas. During World War II Americans
were repelled by the excesses of Nazi racism and perceived themselves
as offering an alternative social vision to the world-a vision of a society in which all are equal. Perhaps in response to Nazism, the neoDarwinian, hierarchic conception of the relationship between the
world's racial and ethnic groups simply collapsed in mid-century, to be
replaced with an understanding that all groups and all people are
63
equal.
Judicial examination of Brown in the context of these new social
realities and ideas could lead to only*one result: the invalidation of racial segregation. During the course of oral argument Thurgood Marshall, then counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, pointed out to
the Court what everyone knew-that segregation rested upon an assertion that blacks are inferior to whites-and asked the Court whether it
judged itself able to make such a public assertion." I am convinced that
Brown's core holding that statutes mandating racial segregation are unconstitutional has become uncontroversial because most Americans today believe that racist declarations about black inferiority cannot be
legitimately made by governmental bodies. Perhaps the Court could
have written a stronger opinion in Brown if it had emphasized that
institutional impossibility when the case was handed down.
It is necessary to distinguish, of course, between the public's general acceptance of Brown's underlying principle of no segregation and
the political discord that still exists over the question of that principle's
enforcement in the context of school busing. Plainly no consensus exists
concerning the propriety of busing as a remedy to eliminate school segregation, but the reason for that may be that neither the Court nor the
commentators have attempted to articulate one. Brown's core principle
of no segregation does not, in and of itself, require a busing remedy;
two further issues must be analyzed before one can conclude that the
correct remedy for school segregation is busing.
The first issue is whether courts have a duty to bring about effective practical enforcement of all terms of the Constitution or whether
symbolic enforcement will suffice for at least some constitutional provisions. This issue does not have any obviously correct resolution. Consti3

See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Education AND

BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 391-92, 492-94, 690, 761 (1975); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae in Brown v. Board of Education, 4-8.
4 See R. KLUGER, supra note 63, at 674.
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tutional rights that exist in theory are not always fully enforced in
practice; some are more significant for their symbolic rather than practical effect. Miranda v. Arizona 5 is one constitutional decisiofi of great
symbolic significance that has been compromised in practice."6 Another
right that is of symbolic rather than practical meaning in much of the
nation today is the right of children in public schools not to participate
in prayer ceremonies. 67 Even in the nineteenth century, some constitutional rights were not effectively enforced: antislavery agitators travelling in the South, for example, did not receive the privileges and immu-•
nities to which they felt entitled under article 4, section 2.08
The fact that constituitonal rights are not always effectively enforced does not, of course, mean that they should not be enforced.
Neither the Court nor the commentators, however, have analyzed
whether as a general matter symbolic assertion of rights without effective enforcement is ever appropriate, and arguments can be made in
both directions. 9 Moreover, the rationale underlying Brown does not
demand that its no segregation principle always be effectively enforced.
Brown can be understood to hold only that a court may not declare
blacks inferior, but a court that did not enforce Brown effectively would
not have compromised that holding; nonenforcement could be the result
of inertia, high administrative costs involved in enforcement, or recognition of the high costs that effective desegregation imposes on school
children."0
Even if we were to conclude- that Brown must be effectively enforced, it is not obvious that busing is the only or the most appropriate
remedy. Other remedies may exist, but, again, neither the Court nor
the commentators have explored systematically what the best remedies
for achieving school desegregation may be. In the absence of such analysis, there is no reason why the public should be convinced that fidelity
to Brown demands busing of school children. Americans' shared consensus condemning institutional racism is general in nature. It may not
extend to a consensus concerning the structure of a racially equal society. To the extent, however, that busing could be linked conceptually as
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See generally Note, Interrogationsin New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.
1519 (1967).
67 See Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976); Buchanan, Accommodation

of Religion in the Public Schools: A Plea for Careful Balancing of Competing Constitutional
Values, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1000 (1981). New Jersey recently passed a law requiring teachers
to allow students a "one minute period of silence" at the start of each school day. Act of Dec. 17,
1982, ch. 205, 1982 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 883 (West).
s See J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 94-115 (1965).
' But cf. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 82, 180-81 (1982).
7o For illustrations of the costs, see J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
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a necessary attribute for erasing institutional racism, it might find
widespread acceptance.
Some might think, of course, that school busing has aroused controversy because of its social significance and because of the real social
dislocations to which it leads. It might be thought that when a serious
social problem exists, no effort at constructing an intellectual consensus
can have much impact on its resolution. Such a derogatory attitude toward the power of ideas might, on the other hand, be wrong.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,"1 indeed, seems
to demonstrate how the thoughtful construction and elaboration of a
legal argument capable of commanding broad public assent can defuse
a controversial social issue. Throughout the mid-1970's, affirmative action, which involves a core socio-economic issue whether some portion
of the nation's wealth will be channeled to members of minority
groups, generated substantial controversy."2 Since Bakke, however, affirmative action has become a less divisive issue.7" Unlike school busing,
for example, affirmative action has not been a target of congressional
conservatives' attacks on the work of the Supreme Court.
Why not? The answer, I think, is that beginning with Washington
v. Davis,7 on which Bakke rested, and ending with Fullilove v. Klutznrick,75 to which Bakke led, the Court articulated a legal position with
which it is difficult to disagree. At the core of Bakke is the holding of
Washington v. Davis that legislation with the purpose of promoting the
well-being of society as a whole is constitutional, but that legislation
which without reason singles out a particular class whether for special
advantages or disadvantages is invalid.7 6 The strength of the Washington v. Davis principle lies in its endorsement of two classical liberal
values which few Americans even today are prepared to question: the
utilitarian value of maximizing social welfare and the equalitarian
value of treating similar people in the same manner.7 7 The weakness of
the principle, of course, lies in its amorphous quality, which renders it
difficult of specific, dispositive application in particular cases. 78
What Bakke accomplished was the application of this unchallenge71

438 U.S. 265 (1978).

See, e.g., the scholarly commentary cited in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288 n.25, and in Bell,
Bakke, Minority Admissions and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3, 4 n:2
(1979).
73 See, e.g., Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. L. REV. 427 (1979).
7' 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
75 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
76 426 U.S. at 238-48.
7 For a philosophical analysis of what he calls the principle of equal concern and respect,
see R. DWORKIN, supra note 29, at 272-78.
79 See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV; L. RE V. 537 (1982).
72
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able principle in a specific manner that itself is difficult to challenge.
The controlling opinion in the case, which provided the fifth vote necessary to sustain the practice of affirmative action, was written by Justice
Powell. 79 Insofar as it sustained affirmative action when practiced by
an educational institution, Powell's opinion held that a university or
other school may admit racial minorities under a different academic
standard than white students if the purpose in doing so is the attainment of diversity within the student body. Powell thereby analogized
affirmative action to the common practice among academic institutions
of admitting athletes, musicians, people from geographic locations underrepresented in the student body and many other special groups
under a lowered academic standard. Such admissions and the diversity
among students that results therefrom are widely thought to broaden
the educational opportunity of all. It would be difficult to argue that
the admission of black students does not have the same educational impact as the admission of students from-to give an example-North
Dakota. Therefore, if a school has authority to lower its admission
standards to admit more Dakotans, it cannot be denied similar authority to admit blacks. Since many people have a vested interest in upholding programs that give special preferences to certain categories of students, the practical result of Powell's opinion was to build a consensus
in support of the practice.
Dictum in Powell's opinion, moveover, suggested a broader ground
on which affirmative action could be sustained. California had argued
in the Bakke case that its affirmative action program was justified as a
device for ameliorating the effects of past discrimination against racial
minorities. Powell rejected that argument because the only body that
made such a judgment in Bakke was the faculty of the Davis medical
school and, in Powell's view, the faculty lacked capacity to make that
judgment. Powell indicated, however, that if a body with the capability
to make such a judgment did, in fact, establish in the record that an
affirmative action program was a response to identified discrimination,
then such a program might be valid.8 0 Shortly after Bakke, this dictum
81
became law in Fullilove v. Klutznick.
Fullilove was a case challenging the constitutionality of an affirmative action program adopted by Congress providing that at least ten
percent of federal grants for local public works projects be expended for
minority business enterprises. The Court, in a series of plurality opinions written by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall and Powell
79

438 U.S. at 269.

30 Id. at 307-10.
81 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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sustained the congressional program. Despite difficulties with the congressional program (perceptively noted by Justice Stevens in dissent),
the Court could do little else. The federal courts themselves have often
made findings of racial discrimination and granted remedies to victims
of that discrimination. If the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment is to be given substance, the federal courts must have such
power.
To deny similar remedial power to Congress would have been untenable. Section five of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress power
to remedy racial discrimination.8 2 Further, the federal courts have a
strong interest in encouraging other appropriate institutions, state and
federal, to remedy discrimination before litigation is necessary for that
purpose. Unless one were to argue that only federal judges have power
to make the sensitive judgments needed to determine whether discrimination has occurred and to provide a remedy, or that not even judges
possess such power, it is difficult to see how the program sustained in
Fullilove or, at least, some similar program carefully drafted to meet
the objections identified by Justice Stevens can be held unconstitutional.
In short, the past practice of the judiciary in remedying the wrong of
discrimination, and the consensus surrounding that practice, provided a
basis for legitimizing the congressional action questioned in Fullilove.
In the line of cases from Washington v. Davis through Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke to Fullilove v. Klutznick, the
Court generated an argument that left opponents of affirmative action
with only irrational, demagogic arguments in return. The lack of a rational legal position has, in turn, reduced the political power of affirmative action's opponents. While affirmative action has not been accepted
by all Americans, the lack of arguments with which the Court has left
opponents has begun to bring forth from the collective unconscious a
consensus at least in the public rhetoric about the subject.
The present rhetorical stance on the subject of affirmative action is
vastly different, however, from the stance on the subject of abortion.
The Court's failure to articulate a persuasive rationale for its result in
Roe v. Wade" is, I suggest, in no small part responsible for the
difference.
Given its result, permitting abortions essentially on demand, Roe
v. Wade poses only moral and intellectual but not social problems: no
identifiable group in society suffers as a result of the Court's decision in
Roe. But at the same time the Court's decision provides little in the
"' "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).

506

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:489

way of a reasoned argument about why or when an existing or potential human life may be taken. And the absence of that reasoned argument has facilitated vehement dispute about what is, in essence, an intellectual or moral issue, as political leaders on both sides of the
question have been able to adopt reasoned arguments to which the
Court and the legal profession lack a coherent answer.
The Court could have written a more persuasive opinion in support of its Roe v. Wade holding if it had anticipated the principle enunciated three years later in Washington v. Davis.4 The Court thereby
could have avoided an issue to which only result-oriented people have a
clear answer: the issue of whose right-the right of a fetus to life or the
right of a woman to bodily autonomy-should take priority when the
two come into conflict. The debate over abortion rages today because
there appears to be no answer to this question in the sources from
which American law is normally drawn. By addressing the question
without providing a coherent answer, the Court merely fueled the
debate.
The Court, however, could have found a basis for deciding Roe in
the principle of Washington v. Davis legislation must point toward a
broad social good and must not arbitrarily impose special advantages or
disadvantages on individuals or groups. The Court in 1973 confronted
a crazy-quilt pattern of state legislation that permitted women to obtain
abortions outside the United States as well as in several American jurisdictions, notably New York. Even in some states having statutes
prohibiting abortions, women could obtain safe, legal ones if they knew
the right doctor; otherwise, they could get an illegal abortion."5 In the
context of 1973, the law served no identifiable purpose in its random
and arbitrary prohibition of abortion. Because of this arbitrariness, the
Court, without taking a stand on the moral issues that abortion involves, might have invalidated all pro- and anti-abortion legislation existing in 1973 and thereby called upon legislatures to clarify or to compromise their moral values and to enact statutes serving some
articulable social or moral goal.
Such a judgment in Roe v. Wade, of course, would not have resolved the moral issue inherent in the abortion dilemma, but would
merely have passed those issues off to legislatures. That strategy, however, might have served all of us well and surely would have avoided
much criticism aimed at the Court. There have been times when the
Court's failure to resolve an issue definitively and the transfer of con426 U.S. 229 (1976).
See Shapiro & Weaver, Sex Discrimination, 1972/73 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 73, 83-105
(1972).
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troversy to a legislative forum have resulted in the resolution of controversy. For instance, when the Court failed in Oregon v. Mitchell "' to
resolve definitively whether the fourteenth amendment gave eighteenyear-olds the right to vote, legislative bodies responded by enacting a
constitutional amendment -that put the controversy to rest.87 Likewise
the withdrawal of the Court from economic regulation after 1937 allowed the emergence of at least some consensus about the ultimate responsibility of the federal government for the nation's economic wellbeing. Even when legislatures have failed to resolve in a definitively
acceptable manner a controversial constitutional issue handed to them
by the Court, as has been true with the issue of the death penalty, the
Court by not attempting final resolution of the issue has reduced political pressure on itself.
Whether or not a different opinion in Roe would have been more
persuasive, it seems clear that the opinion the Court did write must be
regarded as one of its great failures. Declining the opportunity to rest
its judgment on a consensus that may have been emerging in 1973
about the arbitrariness of existing abortion legislation, the Court failed
to articulate any connection between its holding in Roe and any past,
present or emerging consensus. Effective articulation of some consensus
might have diffused anti-abortion political forces in much the same way
the Bakke decision appears to have diffused the anti-affirmative action
forces. What seems clear is that Roe v. Wade, as written, did not resolve the divisive moral issue of abortion by enacting one side's view of
the matter into law.
III.

OBSTACLES TO EMULATING THE MARSHALL COURT

The analysis of Brown v. Board of Education, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke and Roe v. Wade in which we have just
engaged suggests that George L. Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson's
Foundationsof Power can, perhaps, assist contemporary constitutional
scholars to understand how the modern Court can better perform its
role. By delineating persuasively how the Marshall Court established
its institutional stature upon the concept of the rule of law-a concept
grounded, in turn, upon a consensus about the values that law protects-Professors Haskins and Johnson provide a model suggesting how
the contemporary Court can operate succcessfully.
But is the present court, with its existing personnel and institutional practices, likely to emulate the Marshall Court by striving to
- 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

87 U.S. CONSn. amend. XXVI.
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protect individual rights through a rule of law grounded in a shared
consensus? Probably not. Some of the Justices now on the high bench
have shown less than total commitment to the rule of law at various
times in their careers. Moreover, several institutional practices that
have developed over the past half century tend to divide the Court
rather than to unite it behind a singleminded vision of the law. Taken
together, the anti-legalist habits of some.of the Justices and the divisive
institutional practices of the Court constitute substantial obstacles to the
Court's binding itself to the protection of rights through law.
A. The Justices and the Rule of Law
Reflecting a view held by many Americans, some of the Justices,
at least on some occasions, appear to view the Court's process as a
political rather than a legal one. This is true of two different sorts of
Justice, one of which is typified by Justice William H. Rehnquist and
the other by Justice William J. Brennan. Since the departures that
these two Justices make from the concept of the rule of law are quite
different, each must be considered separately.
Justice Rehnquist, it appears, does not believe that the Court
should play any role in the protection of individual and minority rights.
In what is now a career spanning a decade on the Court, Rehnquist
has authored no major opinion protecting a personal right against government infringement-a statement that cannot be made about other
appointees, labelled conservative at the time of their appointments, such
as Justices Blackmun or Powell or even Chief Justice Burger. Rehnquist also is willing to play fast and loose with the law when it stands
in the way of his reaching a desired result. He does not, for example,
feel strongly bound by precedent, as is illustrated by National League
of Cities v. Usery,8 8 where he wrote an opinion for the Court overruling one case89 and declaring dicta in another "simply wrong." 90 He is
equally willing to ignore legislative history as he did two terms ago in
Rostker v. Goldberg,91 where he upheld congressional legislation subjecting males but not females to draft registration.
The work of Professors Haskins and Johnson makes it possible to
see a consistency in Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudential approach of
which even the Justice himself may not be fully aware. Haskins and
Johnson demonstrate a temporal connection betweeen the Marshall
- 426 U.S.
89 The case
90426 U.S.
91453 U.S.

833 (1976).
that Usery overruled was Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
at 852-53.
57 (1981).
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Court's undertaking to protect individual rights and its emphasis upon
the Court as expounder of law. They show, moreover, that the connection was not accidental: that the Marshall Court was able to protect
individual rights only because it protected them through law.9 2 Indeed,
as I have argued earlier in this essay, it is impossible for a Court to
protect individual or minority rights against legislative encroachment
except through reliance on the concept of the rule of law in some
form.9" Thus, Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence should not be seen as
either careless or inconsistent. His attitude toward law and his lack of
concern for personal rights are part of a consistent perception of the
Supreme Court as an essentially political institution that should defer
to other more democratic political bodies unless it is called upon to act
as umpire in a dispute between them.91 By his cavalier attitude toward
law, Rehnquist will help to undermine the ideal of the rule of law; the
devitalization of that ideal, in turn, will tend to undermine the capacity
of the Court to protect rights. Justice Rehnquist must simply be seen as
an intelligent and philosophically consistent judge whose presence on
the Supreme Court raises significant obstacles to viewing the Court as
an organ of the rule of law and a protector of individual rights.
At the opposite extreme from Justice Rehnquist in his concern for
protection of personal rights is Justice William J. Brennan. Like
Rehnquist, however, Brennan, particularly on the subject of criminal
procedure, has at times declined to follow precedent and ignored the
directives of legislative history."
Obviously Justice Brennan has not been striving in his long career
to undermine the Court's ability to protect rights. But why, then, has
his career, like that of Justice Rehnquist, been detrimental to the Supreme Court's adherence to the rule of law? The answer, I think, lies
in comprehending the ideologies that dominated thinking about the role
and function of the Supreme Court during the 1950's and 1960's, when
Justice Brennan first came to the Court and achieved his greatest
successes.
There were, in essence, two ideologies. One ideology directed a
judge to commit his soul to moral truths and to use his judicial power
to lead the nation as a whole on a path toward moral progress."
See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 348-50.
' See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
" See supra note 33. Rehnquist would probably agree with the statement of Chief Justice
Waite, who sat on the Court a century earlier, that "[flor protection against abuses by legislatures,
the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts." FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 349 (quoting
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).
05 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434-35, 439 n.44 (Brennan, J.) (1963); id. at 452-53
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., THE GREAT RIGHTS (E. Cahn ed.) 9-12 (1963). For an unsympathetic presenta92
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Brown v. Board of Education" provided a seeming paradigm of how
judges should act: in Brown, it was suggested, the Court through its
moral leadership had rescued the nation from the moral abyss of segregation. The Supreme Court was urged to seek out other moral failures
on the part of American government and society and to uplift the nation onto a higher moral plateau.9 Advocates of this ideology expressed
little concern over whether the Supreme Court could legitimately exercise such vast power or whether as a practical matter the Court could
enforce judgments issued in its pursuit. Although advocates of such judicial activism were aware of those concerns, it seemed clear two decades ago that progress itself would render the concerns moot.
The alternative ideal of the judicial role in the 1950's and 1960's
focused instead on the impropriety and impracticality of the Supreme
Court's exercise of vast power. Advocates of this second ideology viewed
the Court as a fragile institution which had neither the authority nor
the capacity to remake American society.99 Hence, they urged the
Court to play a minimal role in the American political order. But, just
as advocates of the first ideology were aware of the limited nature of
judicial power, so too were advocates of this second ideology attracted to
the image of moral progress.
The dilemma posed for those who accepted either ideology was
poignantly articulated by Herbert Wechsler who, after admitting that
the Court had come to the right decision in Brown, argued that the
decision could not be justified and might not be capable of enforcement.10 0 The dilemma resulted from the fact that both ideologies failed
to suggest how the Court could reconcile its obligation to provide moral
leadership to the nation with its limited power and authority to do so.
The ideologies thus required that a choice be made between the judiciary's provision of moral leadership and recognition of the courts' institutional fragility. Intellectuals like Herbert Wechsler had the luxury of
observing how difficult such a choice would be. But Justices like William J. Brennan had no such luxury; they had to choose. I do not in
the least condemn Brennan for choosing the nation's moral well-being
over the Court's institutional health, but I do mean to condemn the
ideologies that posed the choice to him in that form.
The ideologies of mid-century need to be condemned because they
tion of the position, see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 11-42
(1970).
(7 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
" See C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 33 (1981); M. PERRY, supra note 32, at 167
n.8.

t See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 36, at 127-74 (1962).
100 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutonalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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assumed that moral progress could come about only by repudiating the
rule of law, not, as John Marshall would have assumed, by fidelity to
law. The ideologies led the Warren Court, in its efforts to protect
rights, to undermine the Court's capacity over the long run to do so.1" 1
Those ideologies have left a legacy that must be disavowed in order to
rehabilitate the Court's capacity to protect the individual from
government.
B. The Court's Institutional Practices as an Obstacle to
the Rule of Law
1. The Court's Choice of Cases
Even if all nine Justices believed the primary duty of the Court to
be protection of rights and further believed that rights could be protected only through fidelity to law, other institutional practices would
still remain as obstacles to the Court's adherence to the rule of law.
One such obstacle arises out of the practices the Court has developed in
the past half century in determining the cases that will receive plenary
consideration. A court committed to the elaboration of law might choose
to hear and write opinions mainly in cases where doctrine needed clarification or could be extended slightly to cover issues on the margins of
existing law. The Supreme Court, however, has adopted a different
practice. It frequently hears cases that raise precisely those issues for
which existing law offers no clear answers and over which American
society is most sharply divided; the Court, in contrast, routinely denies
certiorari or dismisses appeals in cases that are legally less ambiguous
or socially less divisive. This practice, it will be noted, is squarely opposite to the" practice of the Marshall Court, which yielded to legislative
resolution of socially divisive issues and imposed constitutional solutions
0 The
only when they could command widespread public acquiesence. 1°
Marshall practice is arguably linked to judicial adherence to the rule of
law not only historically but analytically as well.
101 With this statement I do not mean to deny to the Warren Court its moral triumphs.
Especially in the one-man, one-vote cases, where the Court seemed animated by a vision not of
consensus but of progress, see A. BICKEL, supra note 96, at 173-74, the vision has now been
successfully translated into a reality for which there is substantial public support. The same, of
course, might be said of Brown v. Board of Education.
10, See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
(relying on the general
consensus that no court could givi effect to a law inconsistent with the "supreme law" of the
Constitution). But c. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 203-04 (suggesting that in that case Marshall unnecessarily reached that issue, albeit to further the rule of law).
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2. The Inconsistency of the Court's Results
A second obstacle to the Court's adherence to the rule of law stems
from the fact that various conceptions of the rule of law all tend to
demand a quality that has been notably scarce in the Court's opinions
in the past two decades-consistency. 0 3 Consistency is at the heart of
the variants of the rule of law that call for adherence to precedent.
Most conceptions of natural law and natural rights also rest on notions
that what is natural is, on the whole, unchanging. Law which rests on
consensus or on the structure and processes of institutions can, of
course, change as the society's consensus changes and as institutions
take on different roles in government. But a society's fundamental
shared consensus and its institutions of government change quite gradually, and accordingly a rule of law based either on consensus or on
institutional structures requires consistency in judicial results.
Rapid change in judicial results, or highly visible inconsistency,
thus seems at odds with the rule of law. Rapid change and visible inconsistency has, however, been precisely what we have come to expect
from the Supreme Court since the 1960's.
Changed results can be achieved only gradually by a Court committed to the rule of law. Brown v. Board of Education,'0 4 the cases
which led up to it, and its aftermath-a process of change which lasted
for more than thirty years-provide a classic illustration. The success
of this gradual change must be attributed to the advocates of integration
-most notably the NAACP Legal Defense Fund-who deliberately
selected and litigated a series of cases in an effort to provide a line of
precedent to support the concept of complete integration established in
Brown. The first in the line of cases leading to Brown was Missouriex
rel. Gaines v. Canada,0 5 a 1938 case in which the Court ordered Missouri to provide a legal education to Gaines, a black applicant to its law
school, on the same terms that it provided such education to white applicants-that is, at a school within the state "substantially equal" to
the law school for whites. Otherwise, Missouri was ordered to admit
the black to the state-operated law school. Ten years later the Court
reaffirmed this holding in Sipuel v. Oklahoma.10 6 Then, in 1950, the
Court decided Sweatt v. Painter0 " and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
'03 For a recent criticism of consistency as a standard for evaluating the Court's performance,
see Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
105 305 U.S. 337 (1938).

332 U.S. 631 (1948).
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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Regents. 08 In Sweatt, the Court found that the law school which the
state of Texas had established for blacks was not and could not be
made equal to the University of Texas Law School, which it had established for whites; the Court therefore ordered that blacks be admitted to
the previously all-white school. In McLaurin, the Court directed that a
black graduate student who had been admitted to the University of
Oklahoma could not be made to sit separately from whites but had to
be integrated fully with white students. Brown I, decided in 1954, extended the integration principle from the graduate level to all levels of
public schooling, but Brown II,"'9 decided the next year, did not require that states comply immediately with the extension. Southern
states, of course, did not comply, and it was not until Green v. County
School Board 0 in 1968 that widespread desegregation began to occur
in the rural South and not until Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education"' in 1971 that urban areas began to comply with
the Brown mandate. In all, the process of desegregating Southern public schools took more than three decades. Indeed, some would argue
that the process is not yet complete.
All this suggests that if individual and minority rights are to be
protected under the rule of law, a somewhat stable list of those rights is
needed. New constitutional rights, like the right of a woman to obtain
an abortion, can not continually spring up out of nothing in the space
of a few years. A Court bent on preserving the rule of law and, through
it, individual and minority rights must adhere to old law, protect existing rights and ignore claims of new sorts of rights until it is capable
of articulating a basis for those rights consistent with its vision of law.
3. The Idiosyncratic Views of Individual Justices
Even a Court filled with Justices committed to the rule of law
would have to overcome one further obstacle. The obstacle arises from
the fact that there are several articulable visions of the rule of
law-visions grounded in precedent, in natural rights, in consensus, in
institutional structures. As a result, the Supreme Court bench is likely
to be populated by individuals who have several different visions or
who have no single clear vision but are attracted to several of them
simultaneously. New appointments to the Court, moreover, will bring
new visions to the bench.
1- 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
'0 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
110 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
"1 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

514

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 131:489

When nine Justices are committed to the rule of law in different
ways, fluctuating combinations will occur, with a resulting inconsistency in results and a seeming abandonment of law by the Court as an
institution. Few doubt Hugo Black's intense commitment to a vision of
law and to the overall consistency of that vision. Yet, the manner in
which Justice Black's one vote came into combination with the votes of
other Justices did much to make the Court appear as an institution
lacking in any continuous vision of the law. The career of a Justice so
devoted to a vision of law thus became synonymous with constitutional
revolution. In short, the ways in which different individuals with differing visions of the rule of law combine to produce a shifting majority
on the Court can transform the Court from a government of laws into a
government of men-it can make results seem to depend on the personnel of the bench rather than on some continuous vision of law preserved
and elaborated by the Court as an institution.' 12
The Court can cure the inconsistency in its work resulting from
fluctuating voting combinations only if individual Justices subordinate
their personal views to an overarching institutional stance maintained
by the Court as an entity. As Professors Haskins and Johnson show in
Foundations of Power, the Justices on the Marshall Court, including
the Chief Justice himself, frequently subordinated their own idiosyncratic views and thereby enabled the Court to adhere to a consistent
vision of the rule of law.11 Early in this century, Justices like Holmes
and Brandeis similarly refrained in the interest of unity from publishing dissents and separate concurrences." But, since Franklin Roosevelt
appointed a series of strong-willed individualists to the Court in the
late 1930's, that restraint has disappeared." 5 And no signs exist suggesting that the current members of the Court are likely to subordinate
their deeply held views for the sake of unity.
"' Arguably, however, a Court which governs in a somewhat haphazard fashion that depends upon how nine Justices imbued with the ideal of the rule of law coalesce into a majority is
something other than a government of men. The results handed down by such a Court will not
depend upon the political will of the Justices or of any other body; the results will be a product of
the manner in which legal ideas combine under pressure of circumstances. Cf Easterbrook, supra
note 103. Since the process by which Justices are appointed to the Court affects Court majorities
and is sometimes highly political in character, a Court cannot be completely autonomous of politics. But neither will it be entirely political as long as the principal impetus behind the decisionmaking of each Justice is some vision of the rule of law.
...FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 7-10, 203, 365, 649-50; cf P. JACKSON, DISSENT INTHE
SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 20-37 (1969) (describing individuality of modem Justices).
114 See P. JACKSON, supra note 113, at 17-19, 98-170.
115 See Harrison, The Breakup of the Roosevelt Supreme Court: The Contribution of History and Biography 19, 21 (1982) (unpublished paper on file at the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review).
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IV. CONCLUSION
As a theoretical matter, adherence to the rule of law may be possible. Professors Haskins and Johnson demonstrate persuasively that the
Marshall Court abided by the rule of law in a philosophically sensible
form. Other forms of the rule of law also may be capable of application
by a court. But, as a practical matter, we are far from a legal system in
which a Supreme Court fulfills its tasks in accordance with the rule of
law. Justices come to the Court with different ideas about their constitutional tasks, and some even view their task in an essentially political
way. This will not change, for as long as different ideas about the role
of the Court exist in the nation, several of those ideas are likely to find
representation on the Court. Thus, it seems improbable that we shall in
the foreseeable future have a Court dedicated, as the Marshall Court
was, to the enforcement of some singleminded vision of the rule of law.
To the extent that protection of individual and minority rights depends upon some such singleminded vision, those who believe that
rights should be protected and that they can be protected only by law
have reason for concern. Institutional realities at the Supreme Court
and in American society at large almost certainly will preclude the
emergence at the Court of any single-minded vision of and dedication to
the rule of law. But the ideal should not lightly be abandoned. It is
important that those who value protection of their rights think and
write about the rule of law, about its relation to individual rights, and
about ways to make the concept meaningful. In reminding us so felicitously of the place of the rule of law in the legacy of the Marshall
Court, Professors Haskins and Johnson have contributed significantly
to what, I hope, will be a growing body of scholarship.

